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GLOSSARY 
This case centers on industrial filter machines and their 
related drawings. To facilitate reference thereto, the appellee 
and cross-appellant EIMCO provides the following glossary of 
terms for the convenience of the court. (R. 4047-73.) 
Detail Drawings - The term "detail drawings11 refers to 
drawings which contain the detailed manufacturing 
dimensions, tolerances and the like of an industrial 
machine, part or portion thereof. (R. 2799, 5 E3, 
5140.) 
Drum Filter - The term "drum filter" refers to a hollow, 
slowly rotating drum with plastic grids or grates 
secured to its outside surface. A filter media cloth 
is wrapped about the drum over the grids. A slurry is 
directed over the drum surface near its top as the drum 
turns. The slurry flows downward over the filter while 
a vacuum is drawn through openings in a portion of the 
drum surface to draw the liquid into the drum. In 
turn, a solid or cake remains, and it is scraped off as 
the drum turns. The cake is collected for transport 
and further processing. A typical drum filter may be 
10 to 14 feet in diameter and 10 to 20 feet in width. 
(R. 4055, 4061-67.) 
Extractor - The term "extractor" refers to a horizontal belt 
filter which is described more fully hereafter. (R. 
4048-4052.) 
GA Drawings - The term "GA drawings" mean "general 
arrangement" or "general assembly" drawings which both 
depict general information about a product or assembly 
and not the details for manufacture. (R. 4905, 
5139-40.) 
General Arrangement Drawings - The term "general arrangement 
drawings" refers to illustrations or drawings which are 
sometimes called blueprints to present general 
information about the arrangement of an installation. 
For example, sufficient general dimensions may be 
provided so a customer is able to make a concrete pad 
sufficient to support the purchased machine. (R. 4905, 
5139-40.) 
General Assembly Drawings - The term "general assembly 
drawings" refers to illustrations or drawings which are 
sometimes called blueprints to present the general 
viii 
configuration (or assembly) of the basic components of 
a machine or of selected portions thereof to better 
understand, for example, the construction or use of a 
machine. (R. 2799, 5 E3.) 
Horizontal Belt Filter - The term "horizontal belt filter" 
refers to a filter with an endless belt that extends 
between a front drive roller or pulley and a rear or 
tail pulley similar to a conventional conveyor belt. 
The belt has raised ribs which extend inwardly from the 
outside edges toward drain holes positioned generally 
in the middle. A cloth (called media) is wrapped over 
the belt. A slurry (e.g., ground coal and water) flows 
onto the cloth. The liquid drains into the grooves 
between the ribs and is sucked down through the belt 
holes by a vacuum leaving a cake (i.e., the solids) on 
the media. The cake is scraped off or falls off the 
belt which is continuously rotating much like a 
conveyor. The cake is transported for further 
processing. The filter may be said to separate solids 
from liquids or "extract" and is thus called an 
"extractor." Horizontal belt filters are frequently 
described by the size of the belt. For example a "112" 
filter has a belt that is one foot wide and extends 
between the front and rear pulleys which are about 12 
feet apart. Horizontal belt filters vary widely in 
size with belts being as much as 10 to 15 feet wide and 
in the vicinity of 20 feet long. (R. 4048-51.) 
Shriver Press - The term "shriver press" refers to a filter 
in which a slurry is poured into an area between filter 
plates which are then pressed to mechanically squeeze 
out the liquid to leave a dry cake. (R. 5239.) 
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REFERENCE TO THE RECORD 
The record in this case includes pleadings, exhibits and 
transcripts from multiple court proceedings as follows: 
R. 0001-3645, 7032-152 Pleading documents including orders, 
findings, judgments, etc. 
R. 3848-926, 3999-5637 Trial Transcript, October 3-18, 1989 
R. 5638-707 Bench decision, November 7, 1989 
R. 3927-98 Transcript of hearing on motion to join 
lone Callahan, December 6, 1990 
R. 7154-238 Transcript of hearing on damages 
December 20, 1990 
R. 3646-846 Trial transcript of Contempt Proceedings 
held on March 29, 1991 
R. 7239-76 Transcript of hearing on motion to 
increase bond, July 8, 1991 
R. nnb Transcript of hearing on Writ of 
Execution, August 6, 1991, (see also 
App. I) 
Exhibits 0001 Trial exhibits including many 
through 103,846 confidential drawings 
Exhibits A-Q Exhibits in post trial proceedings 
including the contempt trial of 
March 29, 1991 
Reference to the above record is made by using the following 
abbreviations: 
(R. xxxx) The paginated record and transcripts 
(R. nnb) Not Numbered Below - References to Record of the 
trial court not yet numbered by the court. 
(Ex. xxxx) Exhibits admitted at either the trial as to 
liability or at the contempt trial 
(Add. xx) The addenda to EIMCO's MAIN BRIEF filed on June 18, 
1992. 
x 
(App. xx) Appendices attached to this Brief Responding To 
Intervenor OH. 
xi 
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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the brief 
of the intervenor because the intervenor in substance seeks to 
directly appeal from orders of the court below without filing a 
notice of appeal or intervening below,1 
From another perspective, intervention is an issue to be 
considered in the first instance by the trial court under 
U.R.C.P. 24. In turn, this Court may review the decision of the 
trial court to grant or deny intervention.2 However, C-H did not 
move to intervene in the trial court at any time, even though C-H 
had notice. That is, C-H was personally served with a WRIT OF 
EXECUTION on August 6, 1991 after which it elected not to pursue 
its remedies in state court. Rather, C-H pursued various 
remedies in the bankruptcy courts to thwart the state court 
judgments. Inasmuch as C-H did not pursue its remedies below, 
there is no legal or factual premise for this Court to ignore 
1
 On the cover page of its Brief, Intervenor C-H identifies 
the case here as an "Appeal from the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT of 
July 9, 1991 and The POST Judgment Writs . . . issued against C-H 
Industries, Inc." (emphasis added). The appeal here before the 
court is predicated on a NOTICE OF APPEAL dated May 9, 1991 
(R. 3067-68) and a NOTICE OF APPEAL dated August 16, 1991 (R. 
3433-34). In the latter, CALLAHAN identified his appeal to be 
from "the final judgment (sic, JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT) . . . on 
July 9, 1991 . . . including Writs of Execution and Writs of 
Assistance issued August 6 and 9 of 1991." C-H obviously had 
notice of the writ because it was served upon C-H. However, C-H 
never attacked the writ below and never filed a notice of appeal; 
so C-H seeks to appeal from decisions below without filing the 
requisite notice of appeal under U.R.A.P. 3(a). 
2
 Under U.R.A.P. 14(d), only intervention with respect to 
administrative orders is expressly permitted in this court. 
1 
rudimentary concepts of due process and procedure to entertain 
the C-H arguments. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the principal appeal by 
CALLAHAN and cross-appeal by EIMCO under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992 and Supp. 1992) pursuant to U.R.A.P. 42. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
C-H has not fairly stated the issues because C-H fails to 
point out that the issues it presents were not raised in the 
trial court even though C-H was directly involved in the 
proceedings below. 
Therefore, the issues raised for review by this Court are 
better characterized as follows: 
1» May C-H first seek relief from a state court writ of 
execution in the bankruptcy court and, failing there, then 
present an appeal attacking the writ, which appeal is denominated 
intervention, 
even though C-H had full knowledge of all proceedings below, 
participated in the proceedings below and had the involved writ 
served on it personally? American Hous. Corp. v. Richardson, 417 
P.2d 973 (Utah 1966); See also Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 774 
P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989). Intervention at the trial court level is 
reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Id. at 1131. 
However, intervention at the appellate level appears to be an 
issue of first impression and presumably will be reviewed as an 
issue of law under a "correctness" standard. Sandy City v. Salt 
2 
standard. Sandy City v, Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 218 
(Utah 1992); T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah App. 1988). 
2. May C-H's claim of lack of personal jurisdiction and 
lack of notice when C-H had actual knowledge of this action and 
all its proceedings, was personally served and personally 
appeared in the case both before and after the events here in 
issue? Jurisdiction is presumed below and is a conclusion of law 
that is reviewed for correctness. State Dept. of Social Services 
v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989); T.R.F. v. Felan. 760 P.2d 
906 (Utah App. 1988). However, this issue was not preserved for 
appeal by C-H. Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah App. 
1992); Madsen v. Brown. 701 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Utah 1985). 
3. May assets of the judgment debtor G & G STEEL 
transferred by CALLAHAN from G & G STEEL to C-H be the subject of 
a writ of execution issued to satisfy a judgment against CALLAHAN 
and G & G STEEL under U.R.C.P. 69 particularly when the transfer 
to C-H was in violation of several trial court orders and where 
C-H had actual knowledge of the proceedings, orders, judgments 
and of the nature of the assets transferred to it from G & G 
STEEL and where C-H was part of a scheme to frustrate the prior 
court orders? See Employers Mut. of Wassau v. Montrose Steel 
Co., 559 P.2d 536, 537-38 (Utah 1976); Caisson Corp. v. County 
West Bldcr. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331 (E.D. Penn 1974). Adequacy of 
notice and a hearing is a matter of law reviewed for correctness. 
See KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (1983). 
3 
4. May C-H, a Utah corporation formed and operated by 
defendant CALLAHAN through his wife IONE and his children to 
avoid the judgment of the court below, and possessing assets 
transferred to it in violation of several court orders, be 
allowed to contest a finding of fact that C-H was the alter ego 
of the defendant CALLAHAN in proceedings in which the defendant 
CALLAHAN and wife IONE were parties, particularly when that 
finding of fact is not required or essential to support the 
action of the trial court nor is involved in the legal issues 
before this Court? Courts review judgments for correctness and 
not particular findings unless essential to the judgment. See, 
e.g., Tree v. White, 171 P.2d 398 (Utah 1946); Helverina v. 
Ggwran, 302 U.S. 154 (1937). Findings of fact are reviewed under 
a clearly erroneous standard. U.R.C.P. 52(a); Bellon v. Malnar, 
808 P.2d 1089, 1091-92 (Utah 1991). 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
C-H claims a violation of "due process". Therefore, App. A 
contains the text of U.S. Constitution Amend. XIV, § 1 including 
the "due process clause," and the text of Utah Const. Art. I, 
§7. No statutes are involved with the issues raised. 
Several rules from Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 
pertinent, including Rule 19 on joinder, Rule 20 on permissive 
joinder, Rule 21 on misjoinder, Rule 24 on intervention, and Rule 
69 on execution. Rule 12(b) pertaining to defenses and Rule 
12(h) relating to the waiver of defenses are also involved in 
4 
some degree. These provisions are reproduced in App. B attached 
hereto. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
C-H here seeks to intervene in order to complain principally 
about a WRIT OF EXECUTION (R. 7115-17) which issued on August 6, 
1991 and was thereupon personally served on C-H (R. 2312-13).3 
Pursuant to the writ, the C-H assets were then seized by the 
constable.4 
After the C-H assets were seized, C-H opted to pursue an 
18-month hiatus in the bankruptcy court and an unsuccessful 
effort before that court to set aside the effect of the WRIT OF 
EXECUTION. The bankruptcy proceedings were dismissed on March 3, 
1993 (App. X). 
Fresh WRITS OF EXECUTION and fresh WRITS OF ASSISTANCE were 
thereafter obtained on March 4, 1993 to recover some assets that 
had been returned to C-H by the bankruptcy court. (R. nnb, App. 
C.) In response, C-H this time sought relief in the court below 
by filing its MOTION TO QUASH PLAINTIFF'S WRITS OF EXECUTION AND 
ASSISTANCE DATED 3/4/93 (R. nnb, App. D) which motion was opposed 
3
 Intervenor C-H claims it "was never served with process" 
in the BRIEF OF INTERVENOR C-H INDUSTRIES, INC. at page 4, line 
18. The statement is erroneous, if not deliberately misleading, 
because C-H was personally served with the WRIT OF EXECUTION 
issued August 6, 1991 (R. 3312-15, 7115-19). The writ was and is 
process. C-H was also served with the FINAL JUDGMENT (R. 2942-
50) and other writs in this case. (See, e.g.f R. 2912-23, 3001-
13, 3075-87, 3107-13.) 
4
 C-H obviously knew the writs were coming as confirmed by 
the fact that upon service of the writs, its personnel were found 
busy transferring $80,000 of accounts receivable to an outside 
entity. (App. AB). 
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(R. nnb, App. E) and denied (R. nnb, App. F). It is not clear 
whether C-H also wishes to complain about these new writs in this 
"intervention.If 
C-H also appears to complain about certain findings of fact 
made by the trial court following the trial of CALLAHAN for 
contempt. The findings hold C-H to be the alter ego of CALLAHAN 
but are not involved in any legal issue here before the Court. 
(R. 3212, 5 C14, 3215, 5 4, Eimco's Main Brief, Addendum 5, 
hereinafter Add. 5.) 
Course of Proceedings 
The BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT (hereinafter 
EIMCO/s MAIN BRIEF) details the procedural history of the case 
below through the FINAL JUDGMENT of March 15, 1991 (R. 2820-27, 
Add. 3) and the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT of July 9, 1991 (R. 3224-26, 
Add. 4.) 
C-H first became involved as a participant in the case below 
when it was formed by CALLAHAN with assets of G & G (R. 3212, 55 
C12-13, Add. 5) in November of 1989 to succeed to the business of 
defendant G & G STEEL (R. 3211, 55 C5-6, Add. 5) as part of 
CALLAHAN'S effort to avoid the announced ruling of the court 
against the defendants pending entry of the FINAL JUDGMENT. (R. 
3212, 5 C14, Add. 5.) C-H's president was CALLAHAN'S wife IONE; 
and both she and CALLAHAN were initial directors. However, 
CALLAHAN avoided an officer's title acting instead as general 
manager (R. 3211, 5 C5-8, Add. 5). CALLAHAN was the sole 
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operating officer at the time the FINAL JUDGMENT was entered and 
also at the time he was later found to be in contempt for lying 
to the court under oath and for transferring the G & G assets 
from G & G STEEL to C-H in violation of several court orders. 
(R. 3214, f E6, 3215, f5 5-7, Add. 5.) 
Following entry of the FINAL JUDGMENT on March 15, 1991 
(R. 2820-27), C-H became a garnishee (R. 2912-23, 2969-70, 
2990-3000, 3001-13). One garnishment led to a dispute over debts 
owed to CALLAHAN and in turn payments that C-H made to CALLAHAN. 
(R. 3014-18, 3121-26.) The dispute was resolved at a hearing on 
June 10, 1991, with C-H entering an appearance through Mr. Fadel, 
the attorney for CALLAHAN, G & G and HANSEN. (R. 3201.) The 
court entered the order resolving the dispute on July 9, 1992 
with C-H then again represented by counsel, Mr. Fadel. (R. 3200-
03; App. H at 31.) At this very same hearing, the court also 
entered the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT. 
On or about August 5, 1991, EIMCO applied for a WRIT OF 
EXECUTION (R. 3272-73). Before issuing the writ, the court held 
a hearing on August 6, 1991 with Mr. Fadel and Mr. Wood in 
attendance. (R. nnb; August 6, 1991 Transcript at 23, App. I.) 
At the hearing, the court indicated that the writ would issue; 
and the court went on to state: 
I'll enter the writ and then you will go ahead and — 
serve it and then ownership will be determined. We'll 
have a hearing. I'll give you time for hearing as to 
ownership. 
(August 6, 1991 Transcript at 24, App. I.) 
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Thus, all those present, including Mr. Fadel and Mr. Wood, were 
put on notice to return to the court to resolve ownership issues 
if there were any. 
Upon issuance, the writ was personally served on C-H. 
(R. 2912-23.) All of C-H/s assets were thereupon seized by the 
constable, (R. 7115-17) less the accounts receivable. 
Following seizure, C-H DID NOT return to the trial court. 
Rather, it went to the bankruptcy court, initiated a Chapter 11 
proceeding and filed a motion to recover the seized assets. 
(App. J.) After an extended hearing (App. K), the bankruptcy 
court ruled to return some but not all of C-H property to C-H as 
trustee and debtor in possession. Ostensibly, the bankruptcy 
court did so because the Constable was still in possession of the 
seized goods. (App. L.) As a result, selected assets were 
returned. (App. M.) 
Eventually the C-H bankruptcy was dismissed. (App. N.) 
However, before dismissal, C-H caused a separate suit to be filed 
against EIMCO in the federal court, (App. 0) and CALLAHAN himself 
filed for bankruptcy. (App. P.) 
After dismissal of C-H's bankruptcy, EIMCO sought a fresh 
WRIT OF EXECUTION on March 4, 1993, (App. C) which C-H first 
attacked in federal court. (App. Q.) The C-H effort was 
unsuccessful, (App. R) leading finally to a motion (App. D) and a 
hearing before the trial court. However, these too were 
unsuccessful. (App. F.) 
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A summary of the various cases and other matters of notable 
significance follows. 
A. STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1. EIMCO v. G & G Steel Corp. et al. The initial suit was 
filed in August 1988 and tried by the court in October 1989. The 
case was resolved by the FINAL JUDGMENT of March 15, 1991. 
(R. 2820-27.) In 1990, EIMCO acquired all G & G assets for 
application to the judgment when entered. (R. 3192-96.) 
2. CALLAHAN v. EIMCO, et al. This is a counter-suit filed 
by CALLAHAN and his wife IONE in Davis County against EIMCO and 
several of its officers. (App. S.) It was later transferred to 
Salt Lake City and consolidated with this action. (R. 3204-05.) 
It remains pending but dormant and is not involved in this 
appeal. 
3. Contempt Proceedings In the case identified in 
paragraph A.l, contempt proceedings were initiated against 
CALLAHAN, IONE and ex-G & G and then active C-H employees L. 
Bloomquist and D. Von Mendenhall. (R. 2384-85, 2504-05.) The 
court held CALLAHAN in contempt based on findings which included 
lying to the court and transferring assets of G & G STEEL to C-H 
in violation of the court's orders. (R. 3206-16.) A JUDGMENT OF 
CONTEMPT was entered July 9, 1991 ordering CALLAHAN to turn over 
all C-H assets to EIMCO. (R. 3224-26.) 
4. Main Appeal CALLAHAN has perfected the instant appeal 
from the FINAL JUDGMENT of March 15, 1991 entered as set forth in 
9 
paragraph A.l. (R. 3067-68.) EIMCO has cross appealed seeking 
expanded injunctive relief. (R. 3117-20.) Briefing has been 
completed. 
5. Contempt Appeal CALLAHAN separately perfected an appeal 
from the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT of July 9, 1991. (R. 3433-34.) 
Briefing has been completed with the Main Appeal. The matter has 
also been consolidated with the Main Appeal. (App. U.) 
6. Appeal Intervention C-H obtained leave from this Court 
to intervene in the appeals. C-H filed a brief, and EIMCO filed 
a Motion to Respond giving rise to this brief. 
7. Garnishment Dispute C-H was served with a WRIT OF 
GARNISHMENT, (R. 2912-23) leading to a dispute over debts owed by 
C-H to CALLAHAN. (R. 3014-20, 3062-63.) After a hearing, C-H 
was ordered to pay to EIMCO the money it had paid to CALLAHAN. 
(R. 3200-03.) 
B. FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1. G 8c G Bankruptcy G & G filed under Chapter 11 
(reorganization) on or about November 14, 1989. (R. 2208-10.) 
The case was dismissed in April, 1990. (App. V.) Thereafter, 
upon stipulation and by order of the court, all assets of 
judgment debtor G & G were transferred to EIMCO pursuant to an 
ORDER TO APPLY PROPERTY TO JUDGMENT. (R. 3192-96.) 
2. C-H Bankruptcy C-H filed a petition to reorganize under 
Chapter 11 on or about August 28, 1991. (App. W.) C-H then 
moved in August 1992 to recover the C-H assets seized by writ of 
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execution. (App. Y.) The case was dismissed on the 
recommendation of the trustee and by motion of EIMCO on March 3, 
1993. (App. X.) 
3. Adversary Proceeding As part of its bankruptcy efforts, 
C-H initiated a new suit in the Federal District Court charging 
EIMCO with abuse of process, misappropriation of trade secrets 
and the like premised on the above-related events from 1991 to 
the present. (App. Z.) The case is pending. In March of 1993 a 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION was filed to restrain 
enforcement of the trial court's fresh WRIT OF EXECUTION and WRIT 
OF ASSISTANCE in the instant case, based on lack of jurisdiction 
and due process; but the motion was denied. (App. R, S.) 
4. CALLAHAN Bankruptcy Mr. Callahan sought discharge of 
his personal debts including the judgments of the court. (App. 
P.) By stipulation, the bankruptcy court has stayed action on 
the discharge of the FINAL JUDGMENT and JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT 
pending resolution of the appeals in the Court of Appeals. (App. 
AA.) 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
C-H did not intervene below, but has sought to intervene in 
this Court of Appeals. Intervention is a procedure for the trial 
court; and there is no reason to justify this Court entertaining 
C-H's intervention. 
C-H presents issues not raised in the trial court and in 
effect seeks to appeal under the guise of intervention. However, 
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all these issues were argued before the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, which properly denied relief. 
The issues or arguments raised should be res judicata. 
The trial court had jurisdiction over C-H assets taken from 
judgment debtor G & G in contempt of court to form C-H. 
Execution under U.R.C.P. 69 properly reached the assets of G & G 
in possession of C-H. Formal joinder by complaint was 
unnecessary. 
The court has personal jurisdiction over C-H directly. C-H 
submitted to personal jurisdiction of the trial court by 
appearing generally to argue on the merits on multiple occasions. 
By requesting relief of the Court, C-H also submitted to 
jurisdiction. 
In all pertinent proceedings, C-H had actual notice and 
opportunity to be heard in accordance with applicable rules. 
Likewise, C-H did not object to notice in the trial court. 
Thus, CALLAHAN and C-H received all due process. Any lack 
thereof is directly traceable to C-H's decision to tour the 
federal courts seeking redress rather than ask the trial court. 
Further, C-H's actions have effectively stayed state court 
proceedings and escaped or avoided the requirement to post a 
bond. 
C-H is not independent of the contempt in which it was 
created by CALLAHAN and cannot escape justice by the mere 
incantation of "incorporation." The court was free to disregard 
"corporateness" and reach all parties in order to do justice. 
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Additionally, C-H and CALLAHAN'S defense of "inability" is barred 
because CALLAHAN'S and C-H's own deliberate acts created the 
supposed "inability" to comply with the court's judgments. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. C-H IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
C-H filed a motion to intervene, which Judge Jackson 
granted. The order on its face did not make C-H an intervenor, 
but merely granted the C-H motion and permitted C-H to 
participate by brief and at oral argument. 
EIMCO asserts that C-H cannot be an intervenor and that its 
brief and arguments should be disregarded. 
1. Intervention on Appeal Is Not Permitted Intervention is 
a procedure for the trial court under U.R.C.P. 24. Intervention 
is permitted upon a timely (usually before judgment) showing that 
the party has a cognizable interest in the proceedings based on 
facts and circumstances of the case. Id.; Republic Ins. Group v. 
Doman. 774 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Utah 1989); United States Steel. 548 
F.2d at 1235. An aggrieved party may thereafter ask review of 
the trial court's decision under an Mabuse-of-discretion,f 
standard. Id. 
a. C-H had Notice Below In this case, C-H had actual 
notice because it was personally served with the Writ of 
Execution about which it now complains. It is not clear how C-H 
in good faith can complain about lack of notice or due process 
about a writ that was issued upon personal notice to its counsel 
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(App. AB) and about a writ that was personally served upon it. 
Furthermore, C-H's founder and General Manager (CALLAHAN) had 
notice. His wife IONE also had notice; and their attorney and 
C-H's attorney had notice. Mr. Wood, Gerald CALLAHAN'S son-in-
law and the new General Manager of C-H also knew because he 
attended various court hearings in 1992. 
It should also be noted that C-H did not seek relief below 
under U.R.C.P. 69 or move to intervene below.5 Moreover, C-H 
should be barred from this appeal because it had actual knowledge 
of all stipulations between EIMCO and G & G, especially as to the 
assets in question, yet C-H did not act to intervene. See 
American Hous. Corp. v. Richardson, 417 P.2d 973, 974 (Utah 
1966). 
Inasmuch as C-H had notice and was involved below as a 
party, it would seem that it has been joined so that intervention 
is not applicable. Even if intervention were still required, the 
trial court could still act to permit intervention even though 
the appeal here is already perfected. See White v. State, 795 
P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1990). In short, C-H was treated like a 
party below and cannot now proclaim the absence of notice or 
knowledge. 
b. No Precedent Exists for Intervention on Appeal 
EIMCO has not found any case or rule of this Court which squarely 
addresses the question of intervention at the appellate court 
5
 In fact, C-H appears to have deliberately avoided 
participation or intervention in the trial court as evident from 
its extended pursuit of relief in the federal courts. 
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level on facts comparable or even remotely related to the facts 
of this case.6 However, where intervention was sought on appeal, 
it was denied. American Hous. Corp. v. Richardson, 417 P.2d 973 
(Utah 1966). Any intervention after entry of judgment requires a 
"strong showing of entitlement." Jenner v. Real Estate Serv.f 
659 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1983). None was made here. 
c. Intervention Is Not Supported by the Facts The 
right to intervene depends heavily on the "facts and 
circumstances" of each case. See Republic Ins., 774 P.2d at 
1131; American, 417 P.2d 973 (Utah 1966). Such a fact-driven 
inquiry makes intervention a uniquely inappropriate question for 
an appellate court to consider7, much less to rule upon. See, 
e.g.. Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 66 F.R.D. 598, 600 (E.D. Penn. 
1975). To so rule is to prejudice parties in the case by 
resolving factual and legal issues best resolved by the trial 
court. Id. at 601. 
For example, the record shows that Mr. Fadel was elected as 
counsel for C-H at least as early as April 1991. (App. H at 3.) 
He was actively involved in the case throughout the April to 
August, 1991 time period. He was present and acting on behalf of 
C-H at the July 8, 1991 hearings and on July 9, 1991, when the 
JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT was signed. Indeed, the record is replete 
with other facts establishing C-H's and counsel's total and 
6
 U.R.A.P. 14 does permit intervention at the appeal level 
but only in relation to certain administrative proceedings. 
7
 This is poignantly so in this case since the intervenor 
appears to have deliberately avoided participation below. 
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complete knowledge. (See, e.cr.r R. 3197, 3201, 3207, 3218, 3220, 
3222, 3274, 3312.) 
C-H ignores the facts in arguing that it did not have 
notice. If there is a controversy based on C-H's unsupported 
allegations, a factual controversy would exist which would be 
better resolved with a record below. However, the record on its 
face does not suggest any basis for C-H to first complain to this 
Court. 
d. Intervention Is Not "Timelytf Intervention in a 
trial court must be "timely.11 U.R.C.P. 24; Republic Ins.
 f 774 
P.2d at 1131. Timeliness usually means "before entry of 
Judgment." Jenner v. Real Estate Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1074 
(Utah 1983). By any standard, intervention almost two years 
after entry of judgment is out of the question.8 C-H has not 
acted timely.9 C-H was in a position to act at any time after 
November 1989 and certainly by March of 1991. With the dispute 
over assets, it could have acted in July and August, 1991, but 
instead elected to wait until 1993 to seek intervention. 
Inasmuch as no rule permits C-H to intervene and no facts 
support intervention as a matter of equity or policy, C-H's 
8
 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232, 
1235 (5th Cir. 1977) (intervention sought one year after entry of 
order); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(no intervention two weeks after final hearing and still prior to 
entry of order); Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 774 P.2d 1130, 
1131 (Utah 1989) (intervention denied two weeks after motion for 
summary judgment and one week before ruling); Jenner v. Real 
Estate Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Utah 1983) (two weeks after 
entry of default judgment was too late to intervene). 
9
 A fact issue better resolved below. 
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participation should be terminated as untimely and without legal 
or factual foundation.10 
2. C-H Is Raising New Issues for the First Time on Appeal 
Few principles of law are more clear than the requirement that an 
appealable issue must first be raised in the trial court. 
Guardian State Bank v. Lambert, 834 P.2d 605, 608 n.2 (Utah App. 
1992); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1358-
59 (Utah App. 1990). 
a. O H Did Not Raise Its Issues Below Particularly 
egreqious is C-H's presentation of issues not raised in the trial 
court but which could have easily been resolved there. Mascaro 
v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987); Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 
922, 926 (Utah 1992); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 
1987). Never in the trial court did O H properly attack the 
jurisdiction of the trial court or raise a question as to the due 
process of the WRIT OF EXECUTION of August 6, 1991. C-H was 
served with the writ and had a hearing at which counsel for C-H 
argued on August 6, 1991. (App. AB.) C-H did not object to the 
adequacy of notice and the subsequent hearings in the trial 
court.11 Moreover, C-H never objected in the trial court to any 
process or failure thereof under U.R.C.P. 12. Thus, C-H neither 
10
 EIMCO believes that the intervention is so frivolous that 
it should be awarded all of its costs and attorneys fees under 
U.R.A.P. 33 jointly and severally against C-H and all in concert 
therewith. 
11
 On March 5, 1993, C-H first sought to quash fresh WRITS OF 
EXECUTION that had issued on March 4, 1993. 
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presented nor preserved any of the issues it now presents for 
this appeal. 
b. C-H Had Knowledge of All Facts, Issues and 
Proceedings C-H cannot claim ignorance of the issues. C-H 
argued against the State District Court's jurisdiction before a 
United States Bankruptcy Court (App. Y 5 15) and a United States 
District Court, which properly denied relief. (App. Q, R.) It 
argued in the bankruptcy court in 1991 that the WRIT OF EXECUTION 
of August 6, 1991, was deficient. (App. J. MEMO p. 7 5 15-17.) 
It argued the same position unsuccessfully to the United States 
District Court of Utah on March 5, 199 3 (App. Q, R). Thus, C-H 
had the opportunity to raise jurisdiction and due process in the 
trial court but chose to raise the issue in other fora. It has 
not preserved the issues for appeal. 
c. Issue Preclusion Applies Moreover, issue 
preclusion should apply. Here C-H is raising issues that it 
collaterally attacked, argued and lost in two other federal 
courts. Those issues should be res judicata as to C-H which had 
a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" in a forum of its own 
choosing. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois 
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). 
By approaching this Court as an intervenor, C-H has 
sidestepped the trial court and evaded summary disposition to 
which it should be subject on the grounds of res judicata or 
issue preclusion. Intervention is not a procedure that should 
operate to arm the intervenor with more rights than it could have 
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had in the trial court. Intervention should not be allowed to 
"prejudice the rights of existing parties" by permitting C-H to 
hide and watch, from a position of ambush to interfere with the 
"orderly processes of the court." Jenner. 659 P.2d 1072, 1074. 
C-H's intervention or participation should therefore end. 
B. C-H'S ISSUES ARE MOOT 
Fresh WRITS OF EXECUTION issued on March 4, 1993 (App. C), 
the day after the C-H bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed. (App. 
N.) Following service of the writs, C-H moved the trial court to 
quash the writs. (App. D.) That is, fresh WRITS OF EXECUTION 
issued in March of 1993 directed to all of the C-H assets. C-H 
then approached the trial court and presented all of its 
arguments regarding those writs. (App. F.) 
The 1993 writs reach all assets of C-H. Therefore, those 
writs render all of C-H's arguments here moot. More 
specifically, if C-H assets were improperly seized in 1991,12 the 
new writs and their service still take the same assets. C-H 
challenged the new writs below by motion to quash and was denied. 
C-H cannot challenge those writs here until it files an appeal 
from the trial court/s ruling. Those writs are effective and not 
appealed. 
If C-H were to obtain relief here, the relief would be 
futile. The assets would still transfer back to EIMCO under the 
later writs. 
12
 An argument not accepted by the bankruptcy court in 1991. 
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C. JURISDICTION OVER ASSETS OF C-H EXISTED BELOW 
1. C-H Assets Belong to Eimco Through G & G The FINAL 
JUDGMENT against G & G and in favor of EIMCO was not and has not 
been satisfied. G & G assets were ordered transferred to EIMCO 
to be valued and applied to the FINAL JUDGMENT. (R. 3192-96.) 
EIMCO thus became the owner of all assets of G & Gf tangible and 
intangible, including causes of action and executory contracts. 
(R. 3194 5 2-6, 3195 5 2-9.) EIMCO thus became the successor in 
interest to G & G with respect to all of G i G's assets. 
The trial court found the assets of C-H to be the assets of 
G & G in the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT. (R. 3211 f C.6 to 3212 fl 
C.14, 3215 13.) CALLAHAN was an incorporator, (R. 3753, Exh. K 
at 8, Hearing of March 29, 1991) director, (R. 3211 f C.5) and 
principal beneficiary (R. 3211 f 6) of C-H, authorized to draw on 
its bank account (App. H at 3) who took from G & G the assets 
with which he formed C-H. (R. 3212 ffC.12-14, 3215 f 3.) He was 
ordered to cause the assets of C-H to be turned over to EIMCO. 
(R. 3215 f 10) He did not. ^ 
A transferee of converted property may not obtain greater 
title to that property than the transferor owned but is likewise 
liable. Restatement (second) of Torts § 229. CALLAHAN converted 
the intangible assets of G & G STEEL and transferred them to C-H 
to form C-H. (R. 3211-12.) CALLAHAN had no right to take the 
assets of G & G, especially without compensation to G & G. (R. 
3212 f C.12-14.) C-H cannot have a greater right than did 
CALLAHAN. Thus, the order to transfer C-H's assets to EIMCO was 
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proper, since all rights in the C-H assets were properly in EIMCO 
as successor in interest to G & G. C-H is liable to transfer all 
assets to EIMCO as ordered. 
2. Rule 69 Reached Assets of G & G in C-H's Possession 
A writ of execution is simply the process by which the court 
enforces its judgment. U.R.C.P. 69(a). Moreover, a party having 
a judgment in its favor has a clear right to have the judgment 
enforced. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 48 Utah 214, 159 P. 
541, 544 (1916). No discretion is vested in the trial court 
whether or not it will enforce a judgment. Id. 
For a writ of execution to issue under U.R.C.P. 69, no 
written motions, notices, or orders of the court are required. 
Writs of execution are simply issued by the Clerk of the Court 
pursuant to a judgment. U.R.C.P. 69(b). 
The trial court had jurisdiction over the assets of judgment 
debtor G & G, (R. 2821 f 1. Add. 3) which assets were taken in 
contempt of court to form C-H. (R. 3211 f C.6 to 3212 5 C.14; R. 
3214 f F.2, Add. 5.) Thus, the trial court could properly reach 
the assets of G & G in C-H's possession. Nevertheless, C-H 
ignored the order of the trial court and made no attempt to 
transfer the assets. 
In this case, the trial court PERSONALLY arranged for a 
hearing on August 6, 1991, (App. AB) following EIMCO's request to 
issue the writ of execution against the assets of C-H on August 
5, 1993. Thus, due process was honored. Further, on the record 
the trial court invited C-H to contest ownership on August 6, 
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1993. (App. I at 23-24.) Even if the court had been silent, 
U.R.C.P. 69(j) and (o) would then, and do now, provide the party 
O H with rights to present its views and secure relief below. C-
H elected to tour the federal courts instead and cannot now be 
heard to protest the absence of due process.13 
D. C-H SUBMITTED TO JURISDICTION BELOW 
C-H made numerous general appearances and went directly to 
the merits of its case in each instance, never arguing against 
personal jurisdiction of the court. It is now bound. 
1. All Appearances are Effectively General Appearances 
Although C-H makes some show of appearing "specially" here, all 
appearances seeking relief are general. Ted R. Brown & Assoc., 
Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206 (Utah 1976); Barber v. Calder, 
522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974). Moreover, anyone appearing to argue 
jurisdiction before a court is bound by the ruling of the court 
as to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's 
Ass^n, 283 U.S. 522, 524-26 (1931). The only proper way not to 
be bound by a court's jurisdiction is not to appear at all and 
collaterally attack jurisdiction. See Id. C-H did collaterally 
attack the state court's jurisdiction, and lost. In the trial 
court, C-H appeared and argued on the merits. C-H is now bound 
by both state and federal courts' actions. 
2. C-H Appeared and Argued on The Merits It is a well 
established principal of law that one cannot seek relief of a 
13
 In EIMCO's view, C-H and its principals have used the 
legal system to create barriers to frustrate the judgments and 
orders of the trial court which act is itself contemptuous. 
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court and still spurn its jurisdiction. Ted R. Brown, 547 P.2d 
at 207. C-H cannot simultaneously argue that the court's powers 
should be wielded in its favor and that it is not subject to 
those powers. 
Appearing before the court to argue on the merits 
establishes jurisdiction. Id. C-H submitted to personal 
jurisdiction of the trial court by appearing generally on 
numerous occasions to argue on the merits. 
C-H appeared before the trial court as a garnishee to 
justify its answers to interrogatories served with a WRIT OF 
GARNISHMENT. (R. 3201.) C-H also was served with a WRIT OF 
EXECUTION and a motion therefor. (R. 3312-13.) C-H appeared on 
August 6, 1991f to answer under U.R.C.P. 69 as a possessor of 
assets of judgment debtor G & G and Mr. Fadel then argued for C-H 
to be relieved from issuance of that WRIT OF EXECUTION. (R. 
3274.) C-H again appeared on May 28, 1993 to argue a motion 
seeking to quash other writs of execution. (App. F.) 
3. The Case Caption is Not Controlling Here, C-H 
predicates its arguments on the concept that it was not a party 
to the proceedings below, notwithstanding its selective, vigorous 
participation. The argument is without merit, considering that 
C-H actively participated below but was simply not specifically 
listed on the pleading as a party, non-party, interested third 
party or under some other nomenclature. It was listed as a 
garnishee. (R. 3014, 3062.) The law is not so shallow as to pay 
homage to the form or style of the pleadings over C-H's 
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substantive involvement both directly through elected counsel 
present at all proceedings as well as through CALLAHAN, MR. WOOD 
and IONE CALLAHAN, his wife. 
4. Formal Joinder Is Not Required for Jurisdiction 
C-H confuses jurisdiction and joinder. The purpose of 
U.R.C.P. 19 to guard against entry of judgments which might 
prejudice absent parties was clearly met in this case without 
formal joinder. Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). C-H was never 
absent from any pertinent proceeding. 
In arguing lack of jurisdiction and notice, C-H appears to 
argue that it was not properly joined by service of a summons and 
complaint under U.R.C.P. 19. Such joinder is not required to 
bind a party or non-party and its lack is not a jurisdictional 
defect. See U.R.C.P. 69(l-o); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 
P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). Heref due process was satisfied each time 
C-H appeared in court. Mr. Fadel was elected counsel for C-H in 
April 1991 and was authorized to stand in the place of C-H to 
defend its interests and assert its claims. See, e.g., Landes 
795 P.2d 1127. 
C-H should not be heard to claim that counsel was blind to 
C-H's interests where counsel had all facts in the case, was 
involved from the beginning and argued for G & G, CALLAHAN and 
C-H at the various proceedings. 
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E. DUE PROCESS WAS SATISFIED 
In all proceedings, C-H had actual notice and opportunity to 
be heard. Moreover, notice and hearings comported with 
applicable rules. Thus, C-H's arguments that EIMCO violated due 
process are groundless. 
1. C-H Received Notice 
a. Counsel for C-H had Notice C-H decided to retain 
George Fadel as counsel at least as early as April, 1991. (App. 
H at 3.) George Fadel represented CALLAHAN and G & G since the 
beginning of this action. (R. 0111-12.) Mr. Fadel thus knew all 
the pertinent facts, received each pleading and was otherwise on 
notice of all issues in the case. 
b. C-H Received Notice of All Pertinent Proceedings 
The principle of notice is that the means chosen should be 
reasonably calculated to give actual notice. Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The cases on the 
constitutionality of notice revolve around a means which has 
failed to give actual notice and whether one giving notice should 
be relieved of using more certain or different or more expensive 
means.14 
Here C-H received actual notice. The principals of C-H were 
principals of G & G. (R. 3210 f B.8-11, 3211 f C.3-8.) The 
principals of G & G were joined and named defendants. The 
14
 Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 
U.S. 478 (1988). See e.g., Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 
462 U.S. 791 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey. 456 U.S. 444 (1982); 
Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1950). 
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defendants received notice of all proceedings routinely as 
required under U.R.C.P. 5(a). Thus, the principals of C-H 
received actual notice of all proceedings. 
C-H was served with WRITS OF GARNISHMENT. (R. 3074; 3133.) 
A FIRST WRIT OF EXECUTION (R. 3312-13) and a second set of WRITS 
OF EXECUTION. (R. nnb, App. C.) As discussed, C-H appeared 
through counsel in this case; and counsel for C-H was on notice 
in every instance, particularly since counsel represented 
CALLAHAN and G & G from the beginning. 
C-H thus has nothing of which to complain, having had 
technical notice under U.R.C.P. 69 (j) and actual notice. 
2. C-H Appeared An adequate hearing should be at a 
meaningful time and place. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, rehfQ 
denied 409 U.S. 902 (1972). Counsel for C-H argued at the 
hearing on July 8, 1991 which resulted in the JUDGMENT OF 
CONTEMPT. (R. 7240.) 
C-H was also earlier represented by Mr. Fadel before the 
trial court at a garnishment hearing. (R. 3201.) C-H was 
likewise represented at the hearing of August 6, 1991, prior to 
issuance of a WRIT OF EXECUTION. (R. nnb, App. C at 1.) C-H was 
offered an additional hearing as to ownership of assets seized 
pursuant to the WRIT OF EXECUTION of August 6, 1991. (R. nnb, 
App. I. at 24.) Declining to take that offer, C-H waited until 
after its tour of the federal courts ended in failure and EIMCO 
again sought new WRITS OF EXECUTION. Then C-H moved 
unsuccessfully to quash the writs in the trial court. (App. F.) 
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C-H cannot claim that its counsel, Mr. Fadel, was unaware of 
and unprotective of the interests of C-H. Moreover, given the 
policy of notice pleadings under U.R.C.P. 1 and 8, C-H cannot 
claim ignorance of the nature and extent of its liability, or of 
an inability to defend itself at a meaningful time and place. 
3. Equity Will Not Support Relief for C-H Because 
"Corporateness" Is No Shield for Injustice C-H is not 
independent of the contempt in which it was created by CALLAHAN, 
notwithstanding C-H's claim that it was impossible for CALLAHAN 
to comply with the court7s JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT. 
a. Inability is No Defense Here Deliberate acts 
causing inability to comply bar a defense of impossibility. 
Brown v. Cook, 260 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1953). 
CALLAHAN formed C-H and moved in and out of positions of 
authority therein. (App. G. at 3, App. H at 3.) Such deliberate 
conduct cannot be used to create an "impossibility" defense. 
Specifically, impossibility of performance is not a defense as of 
the date of adjudication of contempt where CALLAHAN had the 
ability to perform as of the time that the court's subject 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER was entered. Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 
627 P.2d 528, 530-31 (Utah 1981). The subject order was entered 
in written form in November, 1989 shortly after trial. (R. 2220-
23.) As in Bradshaw, CALLAHAN was removing himself from his 
positions of authority in C-H at least as late as April, 1991. 
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(App. H at 3.) Thus, CALLAHAN'S claim of impossibility or 
inability fails.15 
b. The Court Can Reach Assets of G & G Anywhere C-H 
cannot escape the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT, because the court was 
free to seek out all the property of G & G in the hands of 
parties and strangers to the action and transfer it to EIMCO. 
U.R.C.P. 69 (l)-(o). Thus, it makes no difference whether C-H is 
even related to, let alone the same entity as CALLAHAN for C-H's 
assets to be reached. Because the property in C-H's possession 
belongs to another, the property must be transferred as ordered. 
C-H tries to show itself independent of CALLAHAN (for 
purposes of liability on the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT), on the one 
hand, and as an identical entity (for purposes of bankruptcy 
stays), on the other. C-H need not be identical to CALLAHAN for 
the court to reach it directly, but such pleading of alternate 
facts is not permitted. 
c. The Courts Are Not Hindered by "Corporateness" 
C-H cannot escape justice by the mere incantation of 
"incorporation." 
1. Incorporation Alone Conveys No Rights The law 
is well settled that "incorporation" cannot be used to work an 
15
 CALLAHAN has also effectively circumvented the court's 
contempt power below, by this intervention of C-H. That is, 
where the purpose of a finding of contempt is to cause compliance 
with the orders of the court, no appeal can be taken until the 
contemnor purges himself of contempt. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 
759 P.2d 1162, 1167 n.2, 1168-1169 (Utah 1988). Yet, here stands 
C-H (in lieu of CALLAHAN) arguing the very right to possession of 
the assets in question and questioning the contempt finding of 
the court. 
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injustice, under any guise.16 The analysis need not be tortured. 
The corporation is simply a convenient, shorthand reference 
for a bundle of juristic relations.17 The term conveys no 
inherent rights of itself. A corporation is not a "person". 
Such a metaphor is improper here. As Cardozo pointedly directed, 
the "metaphors in the law are to be narrowly watched." Berkey v. 
Third Avenue Rv., 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926), 
reh'g. denied 244 N.Y. 602, 155 N.E. 914 (1927). We cannot 
ignore "the tests of honesty and justice." Id. The doctrines of 
16
 See Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1987) 
"It is one thing to observe the corporate fiction as if the 
fiction were truth — when the fiction is not abused. It is 
quite a different thing when the sole stockholder uses the 
corporate fiction as an instrument of deceit." Mavo v. Pioneer 
Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1959). The cases 
"all come to just this — courts simply will not let 
interposition of corporate entity or action prevent a judgment 
otherwise required. . . . The process is not accurately termed 
one of disregarding the corporate entity. It is rather only a 
refusal to permit its presence and action to divert the judicial 
course of applying law to ascertained facts. The method neither 
pierces any veil nor goes behind any obstruction, save for its 
refusal to let one fact bar the judgment which the whole sum of 
facts requires." In re Clarke's Will 284 N.W. 876, 878 (Minn. 
1939) 
"The fiction is only resorted to for working out the lawful 
objectives of the corporation. It is never resorted to when it 
would work an injury to any one, or allow the corporation to 
perpetrate a fraud upon anybody." United States v. Milwaukee 
Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F.247, 254 (E.D. Wis. 1905). 
17
 See Farmer'& Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 222 N.Y.S. 532, 
543 (N.Y. S.Ct. 1927) (An exposition and holding on the functions 
and rights associated with the corporate form as a convenient 
instrument of business, subject to regulation. As merely a short 
mode of describing a complex process of working out the benefits 
and burdens of corporate members, it is not an entity but a 
useful collection of jural relations.) See also, Harry G. Henn 
and John R. Alexander Laws of Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises (3d ed.) Ch. 7 at 344, 346, 349, 353 West (Hornbook 
Series) (1983). 
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"alter ego" and "piercing the corporate veil" sit amid a host of 
expressions used by the courts to describe the process of 
preventing injustice, fraud, or contempt of the court under the 
guise of "incorporation."18 
2. C-H Fits the Elements of Alter Eao The 
doctrine of alter ego or its equivalent is equitable in nature, 
depends on a consideration of several suggested factors and is 
thus determined on the peculiar facts of each case. Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah App. 
1988) . The two prongs of the test are a "unity of interest"19 
and "unfairness." Id. 
The court below found unity of interests between C-H and 
CALLAHAN. (See R. 3211-12 , 7265-72.) Moreover, all that is 
required under the most stringent interpretation is flawed 
formalities and a showing that a failure to disregard 
"corporateness" would result in an injustice.20 Here, C-H was 
founded to simply take over the G & G business, to disadvantage 
18
 Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander Laws of Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises (3d. ed.) Ch. 7 at 344 n. 2 West 
(Hornbook Series) (1983). 
19
 A unity of interest is often evidenced by lack of 
corporate formalities, but formalities are not the test, only one 
test applicable in many circumstances. See Messick v. PHD 
Trucking Service, Inc., 678 P.2d 791 (Utah 1984). Thus, even 
fastidious attention to formalities would be of no effect here, 
where the entire purpose of any formalities was to do an 
injustice with impunity. 
20
 Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1987). A 
court of equity looks through form to substance and may consider 
certain factors deemed significant, not conclusive, including the 
use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice. Id. 
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EIMCO and to evade court orders and rulings. The court below 
found great unfairness and inequity in CALLAHAN'S conduct21, 
which created and continued injustice by circumventing the 
court7s judgments in a manner rising to the level of contempt. 
(R. 3214-16.) 
3. "Corporateness" Cannot Prevent Justice Among 
the Parties C-H's status as a corporation cannot stand in the 
way of justice among the parties.22 Those parties include EIMCO, 
C-H, G & G and CALLAHAN. The trial court decided that C-H was a 
sham formed to circumvent the court's orders. (R. 3212 f C14 , 
see also transcript at R. 7265-66, 7269-72.) C-H's argument that 
it cannot be reached since it is not identically or literally 
CALLAHAN remains unsupported because behind the corporate curtain 
it is CALLAHAN who is still telling us that we cannot approach 
C-H. The trial court need not sit idly by as CALLAHAN and C-H in 
contempt disobey the courts' processes. 
4. C-H Must Comply With The Judgment of Contempt 
and Turn Over Assets to EIMCO 
C-H must comply with the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT and the 
several underlying temporary restraining orders of the trial 
21
 Incidentally, the adequacy of a corporations capital 
weighs heavily in the unfairness prong. Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 47 n. 10 (Utah App. 1988). C-H 
made arguments that it was capitalized by other members of 
CALLAHAN'S family, not CALLAHAN himself. That capital amounted 
to a few thousand dollars against annual sales of $866,400.00 by 
C-H. (App. AC.) 
22
 Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 830 (5th 
Cir. 1959); In re Clarke's Will 284 N.W. 876, 878 (Minn. 1939). 
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court. The restraints ran to CALLAHAN and "all those in active 
consort or participation therewith who receive actual notice 
hereof". (R. 2221.) C-H had actual notice and is bound by the 
restraints. 
Moreover, the underlying order is not subject to 
reconsideration here, firstly because the issue was not preserved 
for appeal, and secondly because no contempt proceeding may 
effect a retrial of the underlying order. Bradshaw, 627 P.2d at 
532 (citing Macrcrio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 69 (1948)). Such would 
merely "foster experimentation with disobedience." Id. Thus, 
C-H's claim of CALLAHAN'S inability to comply with the JUDGMENT 
OF CONTEMPT does not free C-H of its liability or obligation to 
comply with the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT and turn over all its 
remaining assets to EIMCO. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider C-H's 
position because C-H has not filed a Notice of Appeal. In other 
words, C-H has not preserved its issues for appeal, and thus 
should not be heard. It is and was a party below, and must 
appeal as all other parties. This court should therefore dismiss 
the intervention of C-H as improper and untimely, leaving C-H to 
seek any remaining remedy in the trial court. 
C-H has dragged others through a multiplicity of 
proceedings in the federal courts, and should not now be released 
from the judgments of those very courts in which it has appeared. 
32 
That is, C-H is bound by the decision of the federal courts 
resolving the issues here raised against C-H and in favor of 
EIMCO. 
C-H has had all possible due process, with notice and a 
hearing at every juncture. Meanwhile, C-H even now prejudices 
EIMCO by squandering resources in a forum lacking jurisdiction 
over intervention. C-H should be made to cease these frivolous 
proceedings and answer for the contempt in which it was formed. 
Further, EIMCO should be awarded damages against C-H and it 
counsel jointly and severally under U.R.C.P. 11 and U.R.A.P. 33 
for pursuit of this intervention which is not fairly grounded and 
which has been interposed to further delay this litigation and 
harass EIMCO. 
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